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PROBLEMS IN FLORIDA AND OTHER COASTAL
STATES CAUSED BY THE CALIFORNIA
TIDELANDS DECISION
JULIUS F. PAPER
Of grave import to the people of Florida is the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in United States v. California., By superimpos-
ing the legal doctrine there applied to the tidelands2 of California upon
the coastal waters of Florida, in an analysis of its possible effect on her
sovereignty, on her people and on her industries, the magnitude and
complexity of the consequences, not only for Florida but for other coastal
states as well, are readily apparent.
I. THE DECISION
The Attorney General of the United States, in an original suit in
equity, sought a decree (1) declaring the rights of the United States to
the area "lying seaward of the ordinary low water mark on the coast of
California and outside of the inland waters of the State, extending sea-
ward three nautical miles and bounded on the north and south, respec-
tively, by the northern and southern boundaries of the State of Califor-
nia"; and (2) enjoining California and all persons claiming under it from
continuing to trespass thereon.3 The Court held that California "is not the
'67 Sup. Ct. 1658 (June 23, 1947).
'The term "tidelands" is employed in more than one sense. As used in the
opinion in this case at p. 1664 it denotes the area between the high-water and low-
water marks, probably between mean flood tide and mean ebb tide. In a second,
or popular, sense it signifies the area extending from the high-water mark to the
limit of the marginal belt of sea claimed. In the least precise sense it relates to
the constantly flooded area between the low-water mark and the seaward limit of
the marginal belt. This last meaning has been used in the name by which this
case is currently mentioned, probably because this is the area transferred by the
decision, for all practical purposes, from state to federal ownership.
'United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1660 (1947). Although the
opinion quotes the complaint as claiming "lands, minerals and other things of
value underlying the Pacific Ocean," the decision goes a step further, at 1668, and
grants to the Federal Government paramount rights in and power over "the three-
mile marginal belt," adding that "full dominion over the resources of the soil under
that water area, including oil," is "an incident" thereto. The decision, in other
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owner" 4 of the marginal area claimed by it, extending three statute miles
seaward from the low-water mark on the California coastline. Con-
versely, however, although this would seem to be an inevitable sequitur, the
decision does not explicitly determine the tidelands to be the property of
the United States except by the implication to be drawn from these words: 5
. . . the Federal Government rather than the state has para-
mount rights in and power over that belt [the tidelands area]
an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of
the soil under that water area, including oil."
As a practical matter California and all persons claiming under it are
enjoined from continuing to trespass upon the area in question in violation
of the rights of the United States.
Wishful thinking has impelled some general, expressions among Florida
lawyers to the effect that Florida has a claim to her tidelands superior to
that denied California. Careful analysis of the opinion and of the history
of the Florida tidelands, however, fails to reveal distinctions which are
certain to overcome the concept that "national interests responsibilities,
and therefore national rights are paramount in waters lying to the sea-
ward in the three-mile belt."6
H. FACTUAL BACKGROUND IN FLORIDA
Article I of the Constitution of the State of Florida, adopted in 1885,
sets forth the boundaries as they exist today,7 or at least as they existed
'Id. at 1668.
"lbid.
'Id. at 1667; the original lacks a comma after "interests." See note 2 -supra.
Although the decision covers the entire three-mile belt, including resources of the
ocean bed, the whole tenor of the reasoning relates to oil and other materials
strategic in national defense. A distinction between such materials and sponges,
oysters or fish might be made. Cf. The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166 (1912); Skiriotes
v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941). Furthermore, the boundaries claimed by Florida
extend beyond the limit of three nautical miles awarded the United States.
IFYA. CoNsT. Art I provides: "The boundaries of the State of Florida shall be
as follows. Commencing at the mouth of the river Perdido; from thence up the
middle of said river to where it intersects the south bounidary line of the State of
Alabama, and the thirty-first degree of north latitude; thence due east to the
Chattahoochee river; thence down the middle of said river to its confluence with
rae Flint river; thence straight to the head of the St. Mary's river; thence down
the middle of said river to the Atlantic ocean; thence southeastwardly along the
coast to the edge of the Gulf Stream; thence southwestwardly along the edge of the
Gulf Stream and Florida Reefs to, and including the Tortugas Islands; thence
2
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until the California decision. The tidal shoreline of Florida totals 1,221
miles, of which 714 outline the mainland and 507 surround islanids. 8
These figures do not take into account the numerous indentations, inlets,
cuts, bayous, elbows, necks, sounds, bays, and estuaries.
The management of the tidelands is vested in the Trustees of the In-
ternal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida, composed of the
Governor, Comptroller, Attorney General, Treasurer, and Secretary of
Agriculture.9 Since approximately 1853 they have administered the sub-
merged lands of Florida, both inland and coastal.
These lands have been leased for the removal of oyster and coquina
shell, marl, lime rock, ilmenite, zircon, salt, seaweed, logs, precious metals
and buried treasure. They are used for public ports, docks, seaplane run-
ways, oyster farms and a host of other useful and productive purposes
with which the state officials have long been familiar. In recent years they
have been leased for oil exploration, the legality of which action has been
upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida.10 Millions of dollars have been
invested in projects along the coastline, and still further millions have been
expended in filling in land and artificially extending the low-water mark
northeastwardly to a point three leagues from the mainland; thence northwestwardly
three leagues from the land to a point west of the mouth of the Perdido river;
thence to the place of beginning."
The Florida Constitution of 1868 (Art. I) set the boundary at three leagues;
that of 1865 (Art. 12) at five leagues; while the earliest Constitution, adopted in 1838,
provided (Art. XII): "The jurisdiction of the State of Florida shall extend over the
Territories of East and West Florida, which, by the treaty of amity, settlement, and
limits, between the United States and His Catholic Majesty, on the 22d day of
February, A. D. 1819, were ceded to the United States." The government of the
Territory of Florida, consisting of the territory ceded by Spain, was established
March 30, 1822 (3 STAT. 654). Florida was first admitted into the Union as a state
March 3, 1845 (5 STAT. 742), and on July 4, 1868, after the War Between the States,
a formal transfer from the military to the civil authorities was made (25 FLA. STAT.
ANNr. 326).
'C. Wythe Cook, Ph.D., of the United States Geological Survey, a digest, by
permission from FLORIDA GEOLoGICAL SuRvEY, Bulletin 17, in ALLEN Moaams,
THE FLORDA HANDBOOK 1947-1948, 122.
'FLA. STAT. 1941, c. 253.
"Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 So.2d 388 (1944), application for extension
of time within which to file cert. denied, 325 U. S. 839 (1944). The Gulf area of
Florida is now covered by oil leases from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund to Gulf Refining Company, Magnolia Petroleum Company and Coastal
Petroleum Company.
3
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outward into the sea. On this land costly buildings and facilities have been
constructed. The title to these areas derived from the Trustees of the In-
ternal Improvement Fund over many years under the belief that the
underwater lands belonged to the State of Florida."
III. Tim DISSENTS AND PREVIOUS LAW
That the reasons advanced and conclusion reached in the majority
opinion would evoke strong dissents was to be expected. Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting, takes the view that the marginal belt is owned by California,
which was admitted on an equal footing with the original thirteen states in
all respects. As regards their ownership he states: 12
"The original states were sovereignties in their own right,
possessed of so much of the land underneath the adjacent seas as
was generally recognized to be under their jurisdiction. The scope
of their jurisdiction and the boundaries of their lands were coter-
minous. Any part of that territory which had not passed from their
ownership by existing valid grants were [sic] and remained public
lands of the respective states."
The majority opinion attempts to answer this merely by showing that there
was dispute among maritime nations at that time with regard to the
precise extent of the marginal belt, and also as to the variations, both in
distances claimed and methods of measurement employed, occasioned by
differences of activity within the belt, such as fishing, maintenance of
neutrality and control of navigation. This is a far cry, however, from the
wholly unsupported assumption that maritime states, including as a matter
of international law the thirteen sovereign states that later created the
Federal Government, claimed no marginal belt whatever. Such a propo-
sition can find no support, either in law or in history.' 3
Finally, the fundamental principle of our constitutional law that
powers and rights not expressly granted to the Federal Government are
"Holland v. Fort Pierce Financing & Const. Co., 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76 (1946);
accord, United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391 (1903); see Brickell v.
Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 559-563, 82 So. 221, 226-227 (1919).
"United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1671 (1947).
"SJEssup, THE LAw or TmanaoniAr WAR.s AND MARnm JuRSpicToN xxxiv,
3, 7, 65 (1927); 1 OPPENHEw, INTERNATiONAL LAw 333-341, 452-453 (3d ed., Rox-
burgh, 1920); HALL, INTERNAIONAL Lw 154-155 (7th ed., Higgins, 1917); ByRNqx-
snozx, DE. Dom no MAs DisSERTATio, c. 2 (2d ed. 1744); 1 HAcxwoRlH, DIwwsT
4
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reserved to the sovereign states was completely disregarded.4 Even
assuming that the claims of the thirteen original states were nebulous,
at least whatever they claimed in the way of ownership was never granted
to the Federal Government. Conceding that support for state ownership
of territorial waters could be stronger than it is, the fact remains that
there is no support whatever for federal ownership as against the states,
unless, as will appear further on, there be some practical argument in-
ducing federal seizure.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a dissent as searching as it is brief, main-
tains that Congress rather than the Supreme Court is the appropriate
agency for the determination of issues of the type involved,15 and that no
threat to proper performance of the functions of the Federal Government,
a point stressed in the majority opinion, has been in any manner indicated.
The following passage in his opinion stands unanswered: 16
"To speak of 'dominion' carries precisely those overtones in
the law which relate to property and not to political authority.
Dominion, from the Roman concept dominium, was concerned
with property and ownership, as against imperium, which related
to political sovereignty. One may choose to say, for example, that
the United States has 'national dominion' over navigable
streams. But the power to regulate commerce over these streams,
and its continued exercise, do not change the imperium of the
United States into dominium over the land below the waters. Of
course the United States has 'paramount rights' in the sea belt
of California-the rights that are implied by the power to regu-
late interstate and foreign commerce, the power of condemnation,
the treaty-making power, the war power. We have not now be-
fore us the validity of the exercise of any of these paramount
rights. Rights of ownership are here asserted-and rights of own-
ership are something else."
oF INTERNATiONAL LAW, 612, 623-642, 694 (1940); Fraser, The Extent and Delimita-
tion of Territorial Waters, 11 Coax. L. Q. 455 (1925); Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U. S. 240, 257-258 (1891).
14U. S. CONST. AmEND. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
"5United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1671 (1947).
"I1d. at 1670.
5
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He accordingly advised that the bill be dismissed without prejudice.1 7
The United States alleged that it was the "owner in fee simple of, or
possessed of paramount rights in and powers over," the lands and min-
erals in question.'S Many lawyers have pondered the omission from the
majority opinion not only of all reference to fee simple 19 but also. of an
affirmative statement that the tidelands are owned by the United.
States. Certainly, in dealing with concepts so fundamental, these omissions
can hardly be due to mere inadvertence. Analysis indicates strongly that
they were occasioned by lack of logical, legal or historical support for the
position taken, and by the normal urge to attempt explanation of the
decision without openly destroying the established law. 20
The Skiriotes case,2 1 on the basis of decision adopted by the Supreme
Court, has little if any bearing on the matter, since the decision itself did
nothing less--and nothing more-than confirm the power of Florida to
regulate the conduct of its own citizens on the high seas with respect to
matters in which it has a legitimate interest and in which there is no con-
flict with federal law. The opinion, however, refers to fishing for sponges
"within the territorial waters of Florida"22 in connection with the exer-
cise of state police power; and it is common knowledge that the Florida
sponge beds are located in the Gulf of Mexico rather than in bays. The
obvious implication is that Florida has territorial waters along its coast.
Manchester v. Massachusetts28 sustained the right of the state to con-
trol menhaden fisheries in a bay at the mouth of which the headlands were
separated by less than two marine leagues, or six modern nautical miles.
The violation was committed by a citizen of Rhode Island. The right of
Congress to control these fisheries was expressly not considered, as no
relevant federal statute then existed. Similarly, Louisiana v. Mississippi24
established the boundary between the two litigating states in inland waters
only. State ownership of the beds of all tidewaters within state jurisdiction
"7Id. at 1671.
28M. at 1660.
29Sir Edward Coke states that "a man cannot have a more large or greater estate
of inheritance than fee simple." Co. LnIa. *18a; United States v. Hyde, 132 Fed.
545, 550 (1904); Woodberry v. Matherson, 19 Fla. 778, 785 (1883).
"See note 13 supra and note 30 infra.
"Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941).
"Id. at 75.
2139 U. S. 240 (1891).
2"202 U. S. 1 (1906).
6
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was unequivocally pronounced in McCready v. Virginia,2 5 and was neces-
sary to the decision that Virginia could fine a Maryland citizen for plant-
ing oysters in Ware River where the tide ebbed and flowed, and where
Virginians alone were allowed by statute to plant. Coastal waters, how-
ever, were not involved in the facts of the case.
The decision in The Abby Dodge,2 6 however, rests squarely on the
principle that state territorial waters, geographically speaking, belong to
the state as a matter of law. The waters involved were coastal, and not
inland. Appellant had been fined for violating a federal statute forbidding
the landing in the United States of sponges taken in certain proscribed
manners at prohibited times in the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of
Florida. Since the libel did not specify whether the sponges had been taken
in Florida territory or on the high seas, the decree below was reversed
with leave to amend the libel so as to show, if such were the facts, a
taking on the high seas and therefore in foreign commerce and subject to
federal jurisdiction. Obviously the decision would have been just the
opposite if the coastal belt had been held to belong, as a matter of law,
to the United States rather than to Florida.
The observation of Mr. Justice Reed that "state ownership" of mar-
ginal lands "has been assumed" 2 7 in decisions relating thereto is amply
sustained. For example, in Manchester v. Massachusetts the Court
stated emphatically: 2 8
"The extent of the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts
over the sea adjacent to its coast is that of an independent nation;
and, except so far as any right of control over this territory has
been granted to the United States, this control remains with the
State."
This quotation was preceded by the following:
2 9
"We think it must be regarded as established that, as between
nations, the minimum limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a
nation over the tide-waters is a marine league from its coast.. .."
The basic assumptions, and in some instances the holdings, of the other
leading cases take for granted state sovereignty over the marginal belt.80
"94 U. S. 391 (1876).
20223 U. S. 166 (1912).
"'United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1672 (1947).
"139 U. S. 240, 264 (1891).
"Id. at 258.
1°C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. S. 133, 134-135 (1943); Borax Consolidated
7
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IV. THE PRACTIcAL DIpIcuLTEs RAiSED
It is not the province of this article to trace in detail the history of
marginal belts as claimed by the different maritime states of the world in
varying degrees for various purposes. The significant fact is that the
legality of a marginal belt of at least some dimensions was established
prior to the creation of the Federal Government by the states.3 1
Inland waters. The problem of what constitutes inland waters, as dis-
tinct from coastal waters, was not of major import prior to the California
decision, but in view of the new distinction set up between the two the task
of delineation becomes vital. This field in itself would require an entire
article, but some of the difficulties can at least be mentioned here. Is the
test of the character of a bay mere visibility from headland to headland at
its mouth? If so, is discernment of the other headland sufficient, or must
people and objects thereon be distinctly discernible? Is the limit a fixed
distance of six nautical miles from headland to headland? Or is effective
control of the entrance by shore batteries the test? Or should some other
test be applied?
32
In Pollards Lessee v. Hagan3 3 the title to lands in Mobile, formerly
flooded at high tide, was in dispute. The Court held that Alabama rather
than the United States held these lands, and that accordingly a patent
from the United States could give no title thereto. The doctrine that
Alabama, by virtue of its admission into the Union on an equal footing with
the original thirteen states, had thereby become the owner of the tidelands
within its boundaries was recognized in the California case to the extent of
stating that California has "a qualified ownership of lands under inland
navigable waters such as rivers, harbors, and even tidelands down to the
v. L6s Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 15, 22 (1935); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U. S. 361,
371, 374-376 (1934); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364, 381 (1926);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 11, 13, 57-58 (1894); Knight v. United States Land
Ass'n., 142 U. S. 161, 183 (1891) ; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 394-395 (1876);
Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 74, 76 (U. S. 1835); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
3 How. 212, 230 (U. S. 1845); Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (U. S. 1842);
Lipscomb v. Gialourakis, 101 Fla. 1130, 133 So. 104 (1931); Dunham v. Lamphere,
3 Gray 268 (Mass. 1855).
1See notes 13 and 30 supra.
"Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 263, 258 (1891); BYNKERSHOER,
op. cit. supra, note 13, c II, III; JEssrP, op. cit. supra, note 13, at 355 seq.; Fraser,
supra note 13, at 473-477.
33 How. 212 (U. S. 1845).
8
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low water mark."3 4 If the Gulf of Mexico be an inland water, then Florida
may retain title to its submerged areas on the Gulf side. Although the size
of the Gulf, the nature of its boundaries, and the width of its connections
with other bodies of water all point to the conclusion that such a conten-
tion is probably untenable, it has at least been made. Recently, in the de-
termination of a boundary line in an oil lease, a company took the position
that the Gulf of Mexico is an inland water and that Florida has the power
to lease, for oil exploration, lands extending as far as 60 miles into the
Gulf.3 5
This problem of inland waters affects other states as well. Logically,
the Great Lakes are no more inland waters than are the Black Sea, the Red
Sea or the Mediterranean. What, then of iron ore deposits under the
Great Lakes? Unless that area be arbitrarily designated inland water, over
half of the states are directly and seriously affected by the new law just
established.
Pursuing the analysis a step further, what remains of the inland water
doctrine now? If a state owns to the low-water mark only, do inland waters
exist any longer unless completely surrounded by the dry land of one
state at low tide? If, however, some new theory is to be advanced regard-
ing certain bays, on what principle should it be based? Again, the Florida
Keys consist of a chain of small islands. Logically, under the new law of
the Supreme Court, each island still belongs to Florida, but the water and
submerged lands between them, however limited in extent, are federal. 3 6
Territory beyond the three-mile belt. To add to the confusion that in-
evitably follows the California decision, the boundary claimed by Florida
is three marine leagues, with some exceptions, or nine nautical miles.
3 7
The California boundary extended three statute miles into the ocean; the
"United States v. California 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1664 (1947).
"Minutes of Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund for September 1947, not yet
printed.
"This matter is not purely academic. The Overseas Road and Toll Bridge Dis-
trict issued bonds to, finance the highway to Key West. Over 40 miles of road,
bridges and causeway, valued at more than $40,000,000 and including one bridge
some six miles long, have been constructed along the course of the island chain. By
a lease-purchase agreement involving servicing of the bonds this highway was taken
over by the State Road Department. Refunding bonds have been issued and were
validated in State v. State Board of Administration, 157 Fla. 360, 25 So.2d 880
(1946). It now appears that much of this highway has unwittingly been built on
federal property.
"See note 7 supra. This is approximately 10.36 statute miles.
9
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United States claimed three nautical miles; or .45 of a mile beyond the
California boundary. If, however, the California decision be applied to
Florida, it may embrace three nautical miles only, leaving the beaches in
trust for the public, the Federal Government owner of the next three
nautical miles, and Florida owner of the next six nautical miles seaward,
separated from the coastline by the strip owned by the United States. This
is stated purely as conjecture, since it is presumed that if the tidelands
belong to the United States and not to California for three nautical miles,
the Federal Government would extend its claim to the Flrida tidelands to
the full extent of Florida's boundary, or nine nautical miles from the low-
water mark. This is by no means certain, however, and no brilliant light is
shed on the subject in the California opinion.
Police Power. The Supreme Coure discusses the matter of local police
power functions over the marginal sea as follows:
38
"Conceding that the state has been authorized to exercise
local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within
its declared boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal
Government's paramount rights in and power over this area. Con-
sequently, we are not persuaded to transplant the Pollard rule
of ownership as an incideht of state sovereignty in relation to
inland waters out into the soil beneath the ocean, so much more
a matter of national concern. If this rationale of the Pollard case
is a valid basis for a conclusion that paramount rights run to the
states in inland waters to the shoreward of the low water mark,
the same rationale leads to the conclusion that national interests
responsibilities, and therefore national rights are paramount in
waters lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt."
This can hardly be construed as a final holding eliminating the police
power of the state. Yet if it does not do so, just what is its effect?
Generally, the purchase by the Federal Government of state lands
within state boundaries requires the cession of jurisdiction to the Federal
Government before full jurisdiction of the federal courts can attach.3 9 In
the tidelands decision, however, the boundaries claimed by the State of
California were diminished and in effect a new boundary line drawn, and
all land lying seaward of that boundary became the property of the United
"United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1667 (1947).
"°James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937); see Surplus Trading
Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 650-652 (1930); Fort Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 1i4
U. S. $25, 531, 539 (1885).
10
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States. The opinion takes the position that this area never has been the
property of California; 40 therefore it follows that no cession of jurisdic-
tion from the state is required in order to give the Federal Government
control over the area. California's political authority and police power
cease where its boundaries end.4 1 It may be confidently expected that some
case will soon develop demonstrating that the California decision has
abolished state power to control and regulate the waters which previously
had been considered within its boundaries. There do not appear to be any
legal principles granting a state jurisdiction over criminal acts started and
completed outside its boundaries.
Certainly the tidelands of America, as closely interwoven as they are
with the commerce and activity of the people of the several states, cannot
be considered as a jurisdictional no-man's land. Accordingly Congress,
unless it returns the law to its former status, will be faced with the neces-
sity of enacting legislation to provide for federal control of all activities in
these waters; as long as they are the exclusive property of the United
States, they can be disposed of and regulated by act of Congress only.
42
It seems inconceivable that Congress would go so far as to set up a new
federal bureau or agency, or to confer power on some already exist-
ing agency, to assume the control which the various states have exer-
cised for decades over this great domain in all respects except navi-
gation. Government will be further removed from the people, instead
of being brought closer to them, if fishing, cultivating oysters, building
docks and ports, removing seaweed, oyster and coquina shell, digging oil
wells and engaging in all other activities in the marginal sea are controlled
by bureaus in Washington. Yet the decision leads to precisely this.
Vested rights and interests. The California decision recognizes that,
regardless of the prior ownership of the tidelands, rights previously con-
sidered vested have arisen as the result of dealing with this area as prop-
erty of the State of California. 43 It recognizes that many improvements
have been made "along and near the shores at great expense to public and
private agencies."' 44 It left to Congress the entire responsibility of working
"0United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1665, 1668 (1947).
"IN. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149 (1914) ; Mississippi and Mssouri 1. R.
v. Ward, 2 Black 485 (U. S. 1862); United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336 (U. S.
1818); see American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co., 250 U. S. 2, 11 (1918).
11U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, §3.
'United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1668-1669 (1947).
"Id. at 1669.
11
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out a fair settlement of the respective claims, arising from the situation in
California, and presumptively in all other states, when it said: 4 5
I... we cannot and do not assume that Congress, which has
constitutional control over Government property, will execute its
powers in such way as to bring about injustices to states, their
subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their permission."
Accordingly it seems probable that in any legislation adopted Congress will
not demand an accounting to it for the use made of the tidelands, or for
revenues derived by the states therefrom, prior to the California decision
or during such reasonable period thereafter as may be required to achieve
final settlement of the matter by Congressional action. This, however,
does not meet the major difficulties.
The developments in the tidelands include extensive oil fields in
California, Texas and Louisiana. Docking facilities, oil and coal stations,
ports and military bases (the latter established, incidentally, by the Federal
Government after getting permission from the different states involved)
are constructed on the tidelands of the various states. In many instances it
seems evident that the fixing of low-water mark, and any rule adopted for
determining the line between the inland Waters and the ocean areas, will
physically cut through many of these projects. Some ports were built on
lands granted by the state with the aid of funds advanced by federal cor-
porations; others, by private capital. How the precise rights of private
interests that have invested their money in such projects can ever be de-
termined following this overnight switch of landlords, when the difficul-
ties of fixing the boundaries afresh are so serious, is beyond conception as
a practical proposition unless Congress conveys the title back to the
states.46
To be sure, the Supreme Court intimates and even suggests that in
these instances Congress should execute its power in such a way as to avoid
injustices to states, their subdivisions or private interests affected. 4 7 The
fact remains, however, that any general rule will of necessity perpetrate
serious injustices, though formulated with the best of intentions. The al,
"Ibid.
"Several bills are in process of preparation for introduction in Congress which
will, if enacted into law, revest title and jurisdiction over the tidelands in the
respective states. As will be noted in its 1947 Minutes, the National Conference
of State Governors has adopted resolutions memorializing Congress in favor of
such legislation. So have numerous other groups, such as the Interstate Oil Com-
pact Commission (Minutes of Aug. 12, 1947).
'7United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1669 (1947).
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ternative is to examine the merits of thousands of special acts covering
particular circumstances. And in any event, a flood of litigation may
reasonably be expected, by states as well as by individuals. 48 Strictly
speaking, it is probably true that "demarcation of the boundary is not an
impossibility." 49 But it is equally true that government is, or should be,
a practical means of living together rather than an unnecessary legal
labyrinth through which the unfortunate laymen are forced to grope
their way for the better part of their lives.
V. THE ALLEGED DANGERS OV STATE OWNERSHIP
The opinion of the Court bases its refusal to countenance state own-
ership of the respective marginal belts on the ground that the United
States alone regulates foreign commerce; that it alone conducts our rela-
tions with other nations; and that it alone undertakes the defense of the
several states and bears the responsibility for waging war. The Court ob-
viously regards the supply of oil available to the United States as a
matter of such grave import that this warrants paramount right and
power in the Federal Government to determine in the very first instance
where, when, how, and by what agencies, either foreign or domestic, the
oil and other resources of the marginal sea, whether now known or here-
after discovered, may be exploited.5 0
The first and obvious answer is that the United States is in fact not
only an outstanding commercial and industrial nation, but has also
achieved the distinction, unique among larger nations, of struggling through
"'The Governor of Florida, in an address delivered before the Texas Midcontinent
Petroleum Institute in San Antonio in October 1947, stated that Florida would
certainly litigate the question before surrendering her tidelands to the United States.
The interests of the other Gulf states are equally vital, as the following table shows:
Alabama--6 leagues-ALA. CONST. Art. II, §37.
Louisiana-27 marine iniles-La. Acts 1938, No. 55, §1; LA. GEN. STAT.
§9311.1 (Dart 1939).
Mississippi--6 leagues-Miss. CoNasT. Art. 2, §3.
Texas-edge of continental shelf-Tex. Laws 1947, c. 253.
The Texas boundary extension became effective May 23, 1947, just one month
prior to the California decision. Formerly its boundary was similar to that of
Louisiana, or 27 marine miles (TEax. STAT. Art. 5415a, Vernon, Supp. 1942). The
present Louisiana boundary v'as established in 1938; as to constitutional and
international law issues involved see 39 CoL. L. REv. 317 (1939).
'"United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1662 (1947).
"Id. at 1666-1667.
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to victory somehow in every war it has ever fought, 51 in spite of the
alleged evils of state ownership of the marginal sea. The second answer is
that the division of powers and duties between the Federal Government
and the states was deliberately and carefully set forth in the Constitu-
tion,5 2 and the citizens of this country have not yet seen fit to alter the
compact in this respect, even though the Constitution provides methods
of doing so.5 3
Certainly oil is no more important for purposes of war and foreign
commerce than steel, or coal, or certain other products. The next step,
logically, having in practical effect overruled The Abby Dodge5 4 in the
California case, is to overrule the Pollard case 55 wherever strategic ma-
terials under inland waters are found, and to assign these to the Federal
Government. The final step is to overrule the other cases that stand in the
way and allocate to the Federal Government all strategic resources
wherever situated. Once the process has begun, on the basis outlined in the
California case, there is no logical reason for halting only one third of the
way.
Finally, of course, what is probably the best answer to the reasons
advanced in the majority opinion is succinctly enunciated in the passage
quoted5 6 from Mr. Justice Frankfurter, namely, that all those "paramount
rights" so eloquently championed in the majority opinion were already
possessed by the Federal Government prior to the California decision. The
war power, the commerce power, the treaty-making power and the power
of eminent domain have long been in active use, with results deemed
adequate until the Cali~ornia decision. 57 The power of eminent domain re-
quires compensation to the state for the property seized,58 but it has always
" fn exception to this statement, technically quite tenable, may be found in the
Seminole Wars.
"See note 14 supra.
"U. S. CoNsT. Art. V.
"223 U. S. 166 (1912).
"Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (U. S. 1845).
"See text supra p. 48.
"'See note 59 infra (war power); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941)
(commerce clause); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-
1946, 59 HtAv. L. REv. 645, concluded 883 (1946); Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S.
30 (1931) (treaty-making power); note 58 infra and United States v. Powelson, 319
U. S. 266, 279 (1943) (eminent domain).
"Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453 (C. C.. A. 1st 1927); Wayne
County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417 (1918), aff d. 252 U. S. 574 (1920); see St.
Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 101 (1893); Jefferson County v.
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seemed fundamental to most American statesmen and jurists that the
expense of national projects, precisely because they are national, should be
nationally borne rather than saddled exclusively upon maritime states
or some other class of states. The California decision, however, in its com-
bination disposal of the questions of fee simple title and political dominion,
seems to have taken from the several coastal states not only the own-
ership of submerged oil lands but also the right to control all use of the
tidelands. The states, under the dual sovereignty system obtaining prior
to this decision, managed the development and exploration of tideland
resources most successfully, yet without conflicting with the superior rights
of the Federal Government.
During war, as the last two have conclusively demonstrated, the
United States has evidenced adequate authority to enact legislation
placing all the resources of the nation, including oil, at the disposal of
the Federal Government to any extent that the exigencies of the situ-
ation have demanded.5 9 We are not at war now; Congress can readily
pass legislation revesting title to coastal lands in the states affected,
with such further restrictions on state power to exploit oil resources as
may be required to guarantee the availability of that oil for use by
the Federal Government in reservoir pools, if necessary, and certainly
for immediate use in war or upon threat of war. This would be a far
sounder solution, it is submitted, than placing oil under the direct con-
trol of the Federal Government, at the expense of creating chaos among
the states and those individuals and various other interests that have
invested their money, time and ingenuity in the exploitation of the tide-
lands.
As a practical matter it should also be noted that if oil be considered
the most vital issue in connection with the tidelands, the Federal Gov-
ernment has not been famous for any remarkable successes in either
exploration for or production of oil in time of war or peace. Certainly
nothing has been presented on the record to substantiate the view that
under federal ownership of the tidelands, as against our traditional
system of state-regulated development by private enterprise, more oil
TVA, 146 F.2d 564, 565 (C. C. A. 6th 1945).
"See, e.g., SECOND WAR POWERS ACT, 56 STAT. 176 (1942), as amended, 50 U. S.
C. A. § 631 (1944); EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL AcT, 56 STAT. 23 (1942), as
amended, 50 U. S. C. A. §901 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81
(1943); see United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622-624 (1931).
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or other resources will be discovered, produced and made available to
the citizens of the United States.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND THE SOLUTION
The constitutional issues involved reach far beyond the mere ques-
tion of oil supply for war. Basically the question is whether the citizens
of the various states desire to be governed, in the traditional manner,
by local agencies familiar with the practical problems at hand and
subject via the ballot and otherwise to the effective control of those
governed, or whether they prefer to have their economic life run by
scores of bureaus located hundreds of miles away and subject as a prac-
tical matter to no control at all. Carefully analyzed, the California
decision gives the Federal Government no needed rights not already
possessed; it merely shifts the ownership of, and revenue from, local
property of tremendous value that for decades has been treated as state
property. It constitutes nothing more nor less than one more major step
toward the steady economic strangulation of the states and the destruction
of their capacity to serve their citizens. Perhaps this change is desired,
but if so it should be decided squarely by the American people in the
manner provided in the Constitution, and not by judicial fiat.
Viewed from another angle, this decision sets another milestone along
the road of assumption of the legislative function by the judiciary.60
Admittedly Congress has been slow in acting upon the matter. After
years of debate a joint resolution was passed by both Houses in 1946,81
quitclaiming to the states any title of the United States to lands below the
waters within their boundaries-only to be vetoed by the President.
While at first glance one might infer from this delay a lack of diligence
in legislating, the more probable explanation is that Congress possessed
a full realization, unfortunately not grasped by a majority of the Supreme
Court, of the complexity and practical difficulty of the problems involved.
Speed in matters of such weight is not always the most desirable factor.
The California decision has accomplished one thing; it has removed
all legal barriers to reservations by Congress, if it quitclaims to the
states, of any federal powers desired and not already possessed. It has
"0For an excellent recent example of judicial self-restraint see United States v.
Standard Oil- Co. of California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1604 (1947).1 L R. Doc. No. 765, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); see Comment, 56 YALE L. J-
356 (1947).
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also increased substantially the need for reassertion by Congress of its
prerogatives under the Constitution. This time the blow has fallen on
the coastal and Great Lakes states, but the inland states are not immune
to similar attack from a different angle in the future. It is to the interest
of every state, whether inland or coastal, that Congress nullify the
unfortunate effects of the California decision and restore the law as
recognized for over a century and a half. This decision, left standing,
will inevitably create severe economic hardships and bitter litigation that
will crowd the courts and stagnate tidelands development for many
years to come.
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